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Abstract—Internet topology discovery aims at analyzing one of
the most complex distributed system currently deployed. Usually,
it relies on measurement campaigns using hop-limited probes
sent with traceroute. However, this probing tool comes with
several limits. In particular, some MPLS clouds might obfuscate
collected traces. Thus, the resulting Internet maps, the inferred
properties, and the graph models are incomplete and inaccurate.
In this paper, we introduce TNT (Trace the Naughty Tunnels),
an extension to Paris traceroute for revealing, or at least detect,
all MPLS tunnels along a path. First, along with traceroute
and ping probes, TNT looks for hints indicating the presence of
hidden tunnels. Those hints are peculiar patterns in the resulting
output, e.g., significant TTL shifts or duplicate IP addresses.
Second, if those hints trigger alarms, TNT launches additional
dedicated probing for possibly revealing hidden tunnels. We
use GNS3 to reproduce, verify, and understand the limits
and capabilities of TNT in a controlled environment. We also
calibrate the thresholds at which alarms are triggered through
a dedicated measurement campaign. Finally, we deploy TNT on
the Archipelago platform and provide a quantified classification
of MPLS usage. All our results, including the data, the code, and
the emulation configurations, are fully and publicly available.
I. INTRODUCTION
For now twenty years, the Internet topology discovery has
attracted a lot of attention from the research community [1].
First, numerous tools [2], [3], [4] have been proposed to better
capture the Internet at the IP interface level (mainly based
on traceroute) and at the router level (by aggregating IP
interfaces of a router through alias resolution [5]). Second,
the data collected has been used to model the Internet [6], but
also to have a better knowledge of the network ecosystem and
how it is organized by operators.
However, despite the work done so far, a lot of issues still
need to be fixed, especially in data collection processes based
on traceroute. For instance, collecting data about Layer-2
devices connecting routers is still an open question, although
it has been addressed previously with a, nowadays, deprecated
tool (i.e., IGMP-based probing) [7]. Another example is the
relationship between traditional network hardware and the so-
called middleboxes [8], [9]. Finally, MPLS tunnels [10] also
have an impact on topology discovery as they allow to hide
internal hops [11], [12]. Efforts have been made in discovering
MPLS infrastructures, based on traceroute [11], [13], IP
Record Route option [14], [15], or ICMP timestamp [16].
This paper focuses on the interaction between
traceroute and MPLS. In a nutshell, MPLS simplifies
and extends the forwarding data plane thanks to the insertion
of labels (called Label Stack Entries, or LSE) before the IP
header. MPLS packets are forwarded using an exact match
lookup of a 20-bit value carried within the LSE. At each
MPLS hop, the label of a packet is either pushed, popped, or
swapped with its associated outgoing label provided within the
MPLS switching table. MPLS comes with several advantages:
enabling traffic engineering, providing new services such as
VPRN, and ensuring inter-domain routing scalability at the
AS scale. Some MPLS tunnels may be natively revealed
to traceroute because, when the MPLS TTL expires,
MPLS routers generate ICMP time-exceeded messages
embedding the LSE [13], [11]. However, MPLS supports
optional features that make tunnels more or less invisible to
traceroute. Such features modify the way routers process
the IP and MPLS TTL of a packet. By carefully analyzing
several MPLS related patterns based on TTL values (e.g.,
the quoted forward TTL or the returned TTL of both error
and standard replies), one can identify and possibly discover
L3-hops hidden within an MPLS cloud. A first attempt
has been already proposed for revealing so-called Invisible
tunnels [12].
This paper aims at improving the efficiency of their dis-
covery in order to reveal (or at least identify) more invisible
tunnels at a lower cost. This is done by introducing TNT (Trace
the Naughty Tunnels), an open-source scamper [17] plugin ex-
tension based on Paris traceroute [18], that includes techniques
for inferring, classifying, and possibly revealing MPLS tunnels
content. Compared to our previous work [11], [12], this paper
provides multiple additional contributions. First, we revise
our initial MPLS tunnel taxonomy by clearly distinguishing
“Invisible PHP” and “Invisible UHP” tunnels and by better
classifying and understanding “Opaque” tunnels. Second, we
complement state of the art measurement techniques in order
to reveal most MPLS tunnels and at least detect them all,
even those built to hide their content. Those measurement tech-
niques are performed on-the-fly with traceroute according
to indicators and triggers that are used to determine the
potential presence of a tunnel and possibly its nature. Third,
we have implemented those techniques in TNT and deployed
it on the Archipelago platform [19]. We verified and improved
the design of TNT using comprehensive1 GNS3 emulation
tests. This paper also addresses the question of the calibration
of TNT regarding its triggers. Moreover, using a large-scale
1Emulations details are provided in a dedicated technical report [20].
measurement campaign, we correct and, so, update previous
results [11] that erroneously underestimated or overestimated
the prevalence of some tunnel classes. Finally, all our code
(TNT, GNS-3 configurations, data processing and analysis) as
well as our collected dataset are made available.2
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. II
provides the required technical background for this paper;
Sec. III revises the MPLS taxonomy initially introduced by
Donnet et al. [11] in the light of newly understood MPLS
behaviors; Sec. IV discusses how the content of invisible
tunnels might be exposed to traceroute; Sec. V introduces
TNT, our extension to traceroute for revealing the content
of all MPLS tunnels; Sec. VI discusses TNT parameters and
its calibration, while Sec. VII presents results of the TNT de-
ployment over the Archipelago architecture; finally, Sec. VIII
concludes this paper by summarizing its main achievements.
II. MPLS BACKGROUND
A. MPLS Basics and Control Plane
MPLS routers, i.e., Label Switching Routers (LSRs), ex-
change labeled packets over Label Switched Paths (LSPs). In
practice, those packets are tagged with one or more Label
Stack Entries (LSE) inserted between the frame header and the
IP header. Each LSE is made of four fields: an MPLS label
used to forward the packet to the next router, a Traffic Class
field for quality of service, priority, and Explicit Congestion
Notification, a bottom of stack flag bit3, and a time-to-live
(LSE-TTL) field having the same purpose as the IP-TTL field,
i.e., avoiding forwarding loops.
Labels may be allocated through the Label Distribution
Protocol (LDP4) [23]. Each LSR announces to its neighbors
the association between a prefix in its routing table and a
label it has chosen for a given Forwarding Equivalent Class (a
FEC is a destination prefix by default), populating so a Label
Forwarding Information Table (LFIB) in each LSR. With LDP,
a router advertises the same label to all its neighbors for a
given FEC. A LSR may bind labels to destination prefixes
either (i) through ordered LSP control (default configuration of
Juniper routers [24]) or (ii), through independent LSP control
(default configuration of Cisco routers [25, Chap. 4]).
In the former mode, a LSR only binds a label to a prefix
if it is local (e.g., a loopback address of the LSR being
the exit point of the LSP at the edge of the cloud), or if
it has received a label binding proposal from its IGP next-
hop towards the given prefix. Juniper routers use this mode
as default and only propose labels for loopback IP addresses.
In the second mode, the Cisco default one, a LSR creates a
label binding for each IGP prefix it has in its RIB (connected,
learned, or redistributed within the IGP) and distributes it to
2See http://www.montefiore.ulg.ac.be/~bdonnet/mpls
3In order to indicate whether the current LSE is the last in the stack. For
the sake of simplicity, we will only consider a single LSE per packet in the
remainder of this paper.
4Labels might also be distributed with RSVP-TE [21] for traffic engineering
purposes. LDP is the most prominent label binding protocol [22], [12] as it
is generally the per-default deployment in most MPLS clouds.
all its neighbors. Thus, a label proposal is sent to all neighbors
without ensuring that the LSP is enabled up to the exit point of
the tunnel. To signal the end of a LSP, the last LSR advertises
a terminating label for the corresponding FEC. This label may
either be Explicit or Implicit NULL.
B. MPLS Data Plane and TTL processing
Depending on its location along the LSP, a LSR applies one
of the three following operations:
• PUSH. The first MPLS router (Ingress Label Edge Router
– Ingress LER – PE1 on Fig. 1) pushes the LSE in the
IP packet associating so its FEC to a LSP and turning
it into an MPLS frame. When pushing the LSE, either
the Ingress LER sets the LSE-TTL to an arbitrary value
(255, using the no-ttl-propagate option, called the
pipe mode) or it copies the current IP-TTL value into
the LSE-TTL (with the ttl-propagate option, the
default behavior called the uniform mode).
• SWAP. Within the LSP, each LSR makes a label lookup in
the LFIB, swaps the incoming label with its correspond-
ing outgoing label, and sends the MPLS packet further
along the LSP. While the IP-TTL is not modified, the
LSE-TTL is decremented at each hop. If the LSE-TTL
expires, the LSR forges an ICMP time-exceeded that
is sent back to the packet originator. In that case, the LSR
may also quote the full MPLS LSE stack of the expired
packet in the ICMP time-exceeded message [26].
• POP. The Ending Hop (EH), the last LSR of the LSP,
deletes the LSE, turning the MPLS frame back into an IP
packet. Depending on the configuration, two unlabelling
modes are possible. The default mode [12] is Penultimate
Hop Popping (PHP), where the Penultimate Hop LSR (PH
– P3 in Fig. 1) is in charge of removing the LSE to reduce
the load on the Egress. With the Ultimate Hop Popping
(UHP), the Egress LER (PE2 in Fig. 1) is responsible
for the LSE removal, typically to ensure that the Traffic
Engineering information (or the VPRN label), if any, is
carried up to the LSP end.
When popping the LSE, the EH has to decide the TTL value
to copy in the IP header. If the ttl-propagate feature has
not been disabled, the LSE-TTL will be lower than the IP-
TTL and should thus replace the current IP-TTL, while the IP-
TTL should be selected otherwise (with the pipe mode). This
way, the resulting outgoing TTL cannot be greater than the
incoming one. In the later case, internal hops are not counted,
the IP-TTL being unmodified, while they are for the former
uniform case.
In order to synchronize both ends of the tunnel without
any message exchange, two mechanisms might be used for
selecting the IP-TTL at the EH: (i) applying a MIN(IP-TTL,
LSE-TTL) operation (solution implemented in Cisco PHP
configurations [25]), or (ii) assuming the Ingress configuration
(ttl-propagate or not) is the same as the local configu-
ration. This second solution is implemented by JunOS and
also in some Cisco UHP configuration. Applying the MIN(IP-
TTL, LSE-TTL) allows for maintaining a consistent behavior
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Fig. 1: Illustration of MPLS vocabulary and relationship between MPLS and traceroute. The figure is made of three parts.
The upper part represents the network topology we use throughout the paper to illustrate concepts. In particular, with respect to
MPLS, P3 is the Penultimate Hop (PH). In case of PHP, P3 is the Ending Hop (EH) and is responsible for removing the LSE. In
case of UHP, the LSE is removed by the Egress LER (PE2). The middle part of the figure presents the MPLS Tunnel taxonomy,
as observed with traceroute (it is an improvement of the original one proposed by Donnet et al.) Finally, the bottom part of
the figure provides triggers and indicators of an MPLS tunnel presence when probing with TNT. The relationship between the
trigger/indicator and the observation made with probing is provided in red. Additional information (such as time-exceeded
path length) are provided. This is used in Sec. V for illustrating TNT.
even in the presence of heterogeneous ttl-propagate
configurations.
ICMP processing in MPLS tunnels varies according to
the ICMP type of the message. ICMP Information messages
(e.g., echo-reply) are directly sent to the originator of
the echo-request. On the contrary, ICMP Error mes-
sages (e.g., time-exceeded) are generally forwarded to the
Egress LER that will be in charge of forwarding the packet
through its IP plane [11]. Differences between Juniper and
Cisco OSes and configurations are discussed in details in an
extended version of this paper [20].
III. REVISITING MPLS TUNNELS TAXONOMY
According to whether LSRs implement RFC4950 (i.e.,
ICMP time-exceeded quoting MPLS LSE) or not and
whether they activate the ttl-propagate option or not,
MPLS tunnels are more less visible to traceroute [11].
Explicit tunnels are those with RFC4950 and the
ttl-propagate option enabled. As such, they are fully
visible with traceroute, including labels along the LSP.
Implicit tunnels also enable the ttl-propagate option
but do not implement the RFC4950. IP level information is
not missing but LSRs are seen as ordinary routers; it thus
leads to a lack of “semantic” in the traceroute output.
Opaque tunnels are partially obscured from traceroute as
the ttl-propagate option is disabled while the RFC4950
is implemented. Moreover, an Opaque LSP ends at its
EH with a non-terminating label. Consequently, the EH is
seen as an MPLS hop while the content of the LSP is
hidden. Finally, Invisible tunnels are totally hidden as the
no-ttl-propagate option is enabled and the LSP ends
properly (RFC4950 being implemented or not).
As illustrated in Fig. 1, Explicit tunnels form the ideal
case as all the MPLS information comes natively with
traceroute. For Implicit tunnels, Donnet et al. [11] have
proposed techniques to identify their LSRs based on the way
they process ICMP messages and the quotation of the IP-TTL
in the time-exceeded reply (qTTL and UTURN in Fig. 1).
Opaque tunnels only occur with Cisco routers and are due
to LSP ending abruptly, in an improper fashion. As illustrated
in Fig. 1, Opaque tunnels and their length can be identified
thanks to the LSE-TTL quoted in ICMP time-exceeded.
Based on large-scale measurements and cross-validation using
our GNS3 emulation platform [20], we discovered that the vast
majority of Opaque tunnels seems to be caused by Carrier-of-
Carriers VPN or similar technologies. Indeed, they provoke an
abrupt tunnel ending as the end-to-end bottom label carried to
determine the outgoing VPN is not a terminating label.
The traceroute behavior for Invisible tunnel differs
according to the popping scheme (i.e., PHP or UHP) and the
OS, as illustrated in Fig. 1. While Invisible PHP tunnels are
identified through path length asymmetry [12] (see Sec. V),
Invisible UHP tunnels provoke a duplicated IP (at least with
the IOS 15.2). Upon the reception of a packet having an IP-
TTL of 1, the Egress LER (PE2 in Fig. 1) does not decrement
this TTL, but, rather, forwards the packet to the next hop (CE2
in the example), so that the Egress does not show up in the
trace. In contrast, the next hop will appear twice: once for
the probe that should have expired at the Egress and once at
the next probe. This surprising pattern, a duplicated IP at two
successive hops, illustrated as “Invisible UHP” in Fig. 1 might
be misunderstood as a forwarding loop.
IV. HIDDEN TUNNEL REVELATION
Techniques for revealing the content of Invisible PHP and
UHP tunnels are similar. However, in the case of an Invisible
PHP tunnel, they can be applied directly as we know both
ends of the tunnel (Ingress and Egress LER – see Fig. 1).
However, for Invisible UHP the Egress LER is missing from
the traceroute output (see Fig. 1).
It is, nevertheless, possible with Invisible UHP to infer the
outgoing IP interface of the Egress LER (the right interface,
in green, on PE2 in Fig. 1). Thanks to its retrieval, TNT can
force replies from the Egress LER incoming interface (the left
one, in red, on PE2 in Fig. 1). The inference of the outgoing
interface, called buddy, assumes, for the sake of simplicity
although it can be extended, a simple point-to-point connection
between the Egress LER and its next-hop. The corresponding
IP addresses should then belong to a /31 or a /30 prefix [7],
[27] and are called buddies.
With a /30, four IP addresses are available: addresses 0 and
3 are the network and broadcast addresses while addresses
1 and 2 are used for numbering interfaces. Based on that, it
is quite straightforward to guess the address of CE2’s buddy
(i.e., PE2.right in Fig. 1). If CE2.left corresponds to address
0 (resp. address 3) in a /30, it means that PE2 and CE2
share a /31 and PE2.right is address 1 (resp. address 2) of
the /30. However, if CE2.left corresponds to /30 adresses
1, we launch a ping towards address 0 within the /30. If
an echo-reply is received, both interfaces are on a /31
and PE2.right corresponds to address 0. Otherwise, PE2.right
belongs to address 2. The same reasoning can be done with
address 2 in the /30 for CE2.left.
As ICMP time-exceeded typically contains the IP ad-
dress of the incoming interface having received the expired
probe, running a traceroute towards the inferred address
of PE2.right allows to obtain PE2.left. Once the potential
Ingress and Egress LERs are known, we can launch a hidden
tunnel revelation technique, i.e., DPR or BRPR [12]. The
choice of the technique depends on the way labels have been
bound to destination prefixes (see Sec. II-A). It is worth
recalling that we can easily discriminate Cisco and Juniper
devices using network fingerprinting [28].
On the one hand, with ordered LSP control (Juniper default
case), all the external BGP transit traffic goes through MPLS
tunnels while the traffic destined to internal prefixes relies on
IP forwarding. A single traceroute targeting the Egress
LER is enough to reveal all LSRs along the LSP. This tech-
nique is called Direct Path Revelation (DPR). Applying DPR
on Fig. 1, TNT simply sends probes targeting PE2 revealing
P1, P2, and P3 in a row (without labels, as for IP traffic).
On the other hand, with independent LSP control (Cisco
default case), LDP is enabled at a wider scope such that
each LSR binds labels for each prefix in its IGP RIB. Since
traceroute naturally reveals the incoming IP interface of
each Egress LER, we can apply a recursive traceroute
approach that targets this last internal prefix to reveal each
intermediate hop in a backward fashion from the Egress
LER to the Ingress LER. This technique is called Backward
Recursive Path Revelation (BRPR). Applying BRPR on Fig. 1,
we first send a traceroute towards PE2 and discover P3.
We next send a traceroute towards P3 and discover P2
and so on until the Ingress LER is met again.
V. TNT DESIGN
This section introduces our tool, TNT (Trace the Naughty
Tunnels), able to reveal most of MPLS tunnels hidden along a
path. TNT is built upon Paris Traceroute [18] to mitigate load
balancing issues.
TNT consists in collecting, in a hop-limited fashion, inter-
mediate IP addresses between the vantage point and a target.
Tracing a particular destination ends when the target has been
reached or a gap has been encountered (e.g., five consecutive
non-responding hops). TNT uses a moving window of two
hops such that, at each iteration, it looks for <Ingress/Egress>
pairs of candidates, possibly hiding Invisible tunnels.
For each pair of collected IP addresses, TNT checks for the
presence of tunnels through so called indicators and triggers.
The former provides reliable indications about the presence
of an MPLS tunnel without necessarily requiring additional
probing. Generally, indicators suggest uniform tunnels (or to
the last hop of an Opaque tunnel), and are basic evidence
of visible MPLS presence such as LSEs quoted in the ICMP
time-exceeded packet (see Sec. V-A for details). Triggers,
except DUP_IP, are unsigned values suggesting the presence
of Invisible tunnels through a large shifting in path length (see
Sec. V-A for more details). When exceeding a given threshold
T , triggers fire path revelation methods between the candidate
Ingress and Egress LERs as already developed in Sec. IV.
A. Indicators and Triggers
Listing 1 provides the pseudo-code for checking indicators
and triggers such as implemented in TNT.
Listing 1: Pseudo-code for checking indicators and triggers
1 i f ( i s _ m p l s ( cur_hop ) )
2 i f (TLSE_TTL < cur_hop . l s e _ t t l < 255)
3 re turn LSE−TTL #Opaque t u n n e l
4 e l s e
5 re turn LSE # E x p l i c i t t u n n e l
6
7 i f ( cur_hop . q t t l > 1 )
8 re turn qTTL # I m p l i c i t t u n n e l
9
10 i f ( cur_hop == nex t_hop )
11 re turn DUP_IP # I n v i s i b l e UHP t u n n e l
12
13 # i n f e r r i n g p a t h l e n g t h from raw TTLs
14 LTER = p a t h _ l e n ( cur_hop . t t l _ t e )
15 LERR = p a t h _ l e n ( cur_hop . t t l _ e r )
16 LT = cur_hop . p r o b e _ t t l
17 d i f f _ t e _ e r = LTER − LERR
18
19 i f ( s i g n _ i s _ j u n O S ( cur_hop ) )
20 i f ( d i f f _ t e _ e r ≥ TRTLA )
21 re turn RTLA # I n v i s i b l e PHP t u n n e l
22 e l i f ( | d i f f _ t e _ e r | > TUTURN )
23 re turn UTURN # I m p l i c i t t u n n e l
24 i f ( LTER − LT ≥ TFRPLA )
25 re turn FRPLA # I n v i s i b l e PHP t u n n e l
Tunnels indicators are pieces of evidence of MPLS tunnel
presence and concern cases where tunnels (or parts of them)
can be directly retrieved from the original traceroute.
Explicit tunnels are indicated through LSEs directly quoted
in the ICMP time-exceeded message – See line 5 in
Listing 1 and traceroute output on Fig. 1. Fig. 1 high-
lights the main patterns TNT looks for firing additional path
revelation in a simple scenario where forward and return paths
are symmetrical.
The indicator for Opaque tunnels consists in a single hop
LSP with a quoted LSE-TTL not being equal to an expired
value. This abnormal behavior is due to the way labels are
handled with Cisco routers, in particular with VPRN tunnel
ending. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 where we get a value of 252
because the LSP is actually 3 hops long. This surprising quoted
LSE-TTL is an evidence in itself. It is illustrated in lines 2 to 3
in Listing 1, where a hop is tagged as Opaque if the quoted
LSE-TTL is between a minimum threshold, TLSE_TTL(see
Sec. VI for fixing a value for the threshold) and 254 (LSE-
TTL is initialized to 255).
Implicit tunnels are detected through qTTL and/or UTURN
indicators [11]. First, if the IP-TTL quoted in an ICMP
time-exceeded message (qTTL) is greater than one, it
likely reveals the ttl-propagate option at the Ingress LER
of an LSP. For each subsequent traceroute probe within
the LSP, the qTTL will be one greater, resulting in an increas-
ing sequence of qTTL values. This indicator is considered in
line 7 in Listing 1. Second and by default, the UTURN indica-
tor relies on the fact that LSRs send ICMP time-exceeded
messages to the Egress LER which, in its turns, forwards
the packets to the probing source. However, such LSR reply
directly to other kinds of probes (e.g., echo-request)
using their own IP forwarding table, if available. As a result,
return paths are generally shorter considering echo-reply
messages than regarding time-exceeded replies. Thereby,
the UTURN indicator reflects this difference in these lengths.
On the one hand, such indicators are generally pieces of
evidence of visible MPLS tunnels not requiring further probing
(except for some LSE values, shown at line 2, also being
triggers for Opaque tunnels). On the other hand, triggers are
patterns suggesting the presence of Invisible tunnels (both PHP
and UHP) that could be revealed using additional probing (see
Sec. IV). In this category, TNT looks first for potential Invisible
UHP tunnels (line 10). As explained in Sec. III, they occur
with Cisco routers using IOS 15.2 and result in a duplicate IP
address in the trace output (CE2 in Fig. 1).
The two remaining triggers, RTLA (Return Tunnel Length
Analysis) and FRPLA (Forward/Return Path Analysis) [12]),
rely on path lengths. More precisely, RTLA is the difference
between the time-exceeded and the echo-reply return
path lengths, while FRPLA is the difference between the
forward and the return path lengths of traceroute probes
and associated replies. Both triggers are based on the idea that
replies sent back to the vantage point are also likely to cross
back the MPLS cloud, which will apply the MIN(IP-TTL,
LSE-TTL) operation at the EH of the return tunnel. In the
absence of Invisible tunnel, we expect those triggers to have a
value equal or close to 0. Therefore, any significant deviation
from this value is interpreted as the potential presence of an
Invisible MPLS cloud, and thus, fires additional path revelation
techniques (see Sec. IV).
To check for those triggers, we first extract the key distances
thanks to the IP-TTLs in replies received by the vantage point
(lines 14 to ?? in Listing 1). Since RTLA only works with
JunOS routers [12], prior to estimating the triggers, TNT uses
network fingerprinting [28] to determine the router brand of
the potential Egress LER (line 19 in Listing 1).
In the presence of a JunOS hardware (line 19),
time-exceeded and echo-reply packets have different
initial TTL values [28], and the RTLA trigger can exploit
the TTL gap between those two kinds of messages caused
by the MIN(IP-TTL, LSE-TTL) behavior at the Egress LER.
Indeed, the LERR is longer than the LJ
TE
R as the MIN operation
considers a differentiated pick. This difference represents the
number of LSRs in the return LSP, and is compared to a pre-
defined threshold TRTLA(line 20). This threshold (see Sec. VI
for the parameter calibration) filters very short LSPs. Finally,
if the signature does not correspond to JunOS, TNT fallback
to the UTURN indicator (see line 23).
FRPLA is more generic and applies thus to any config-
uration. FRPLA allows to compare, at the AS granularity,
the forward (i.e., LT ) and return paths (i.e., LTER ) length
distribution. Return paths are expected to be longer than
forward ones as the tunnel hops are not counted in the forward
paths, while they are taken into account in the return paths
due to the MIN(IP-TTL, LSE-TTL) behavior at the return
Egress LER. Then, we can statistically analyze their length
difference and check if a shift appears (see Line 24). This is
illustrated in Fig. 1 (“Invisible PHP”) in which LT is 3 while
LTER is equal to 6, leading so to an estimation of the return
tunnel length of 3. In general, when no IP hop is hidden, we
expect that the resulting distribution will look like a normal
distribution centered in 0 (i.e., forward and return paths have,
on average, a similar length). If we rather observe a significant
and generalized shift towards positive values, it means the
AS makes probably use of the no-ttl-propagate option.
In order to handle path asymmetry, TNT uses a threshold,
TFRPLA> 0, to avoid generating numerous false positives.
B. TNT Limits
By using GNS3, we aimed first at verifying that the in-
ference assumptions considered in the wild are correct and
reproducible under a controlled environment. Second, some
of the phenomena we exploit to reveal tunnels in the wild
have been directly discovered in our testbed. Indeed, using
our testbed we reverse-engineered the TTL processing (con-
sidering many MPLS configurations, focusing on the POP
operation) of some common OSes used by many real routers.
Details of experiments done with GNS3 are provided in the
extended version of this paper [20].
Table I provides a summary of TNT capacities considering
several MPLS usages in standard configurations. For example,
it shows that TNT is able to discriminate between Cisco Invis-
ible UHP and PHP tunnels while it is not the case for Juniper
Configurations Pop Cisco iOS15.2 Juniper VMX
P2P circuits PHP FRPLA, BRPR RTLA, DPR
(e.g. LDP or UHP DUP_IP, BRPR ++ RTLA, DPR
RSVP-TE tunnels) 24 2
P2MP overlays PHP LSE-TTL, - RTLA ++, -
(e.g. VPRN: CsC or UHP LSE-TTL++, - N/A
VPN BGP-MPLS) 4 4
TABLE I: TNT revelation (2) and classification (4) capacities
according to the OS and the MPLS tunneling underlying
technologies (P2P or P2MP). This table also provides the
default indicator/trigger and its associated path revelation
method (when it applies).
routers. Indeed, for both UHP/PHP Juniper configurations, the
trigger and the revelation methods are the same (RTLA and
DPR). Moreover, we also show for which cases our basic set
of techniques need to be extended for enabling revelation and
distinction among different classes. We use the symbol ++
to enforce these new requirements that are described in detail
in our technical report. Revealing UHP Cisco tunnels requires
in particular to extend BRPR with the additional buddy()
function and UDP probing. Another example is LSE-TTL++
that simply means that the quoted LSE-TTL is equal to 255.
As shown by Table I, VPRN tunnels may be classified by
TNT. In practice, they conduct to distinct surprising patterns:
opaque tunnels for Cisco routers and non monotonic TTL
evolution with Juniper routers.
Our GNS3 platform shows that VPRN content cannot be
revealed with TNT, while other Opaque tunnels configurations
(i.e., routing devices heterogeneity, BGP edge configuration)
can. The absence of content revelation can be explained by
the IP address collected by TNT from the source IP field in
the ICMP reply. Usually, the collected address is the one of
the incoming interface of the Egress PE, while in the VPRN
case, it is the one assigned to the interface linked to the
VRF. In practice, this corresponds to the outgoing interface
towards the VPN at the customer’s side. Said otherwise, TNT
collects the outgoing address instead of the incoming one.
While the outgoing address usually allows TNT to get the
incoming one, it turns out to be impossible within a VPRN
(details are provided in [20] – in particular, we explain why
such opaque tunnels are not revealed but are detectable and
can be distinguished from other kinds of P2P tunnels).
VI. TNT CALIBRATION
For calibrating various TNT thresholds, we deployed TNT
on three vantage points (VPs) over the Archipelago infras-
tructure [19]. VPs were located in Europe (Belgium), North
America (San Diego), and Asia (Tokyo).
TNT was run on April 6th, 2018 towards a set of 10,000
destinations (randomly chosen among the whole set of
Archipelago destinations list). Each VP had its own list of
destinations, without any overlapping.
From indicators and triggers described in Sec. V-A, it is
obvious that UTURN is equivalent to RTLA for Juniper routers.
However, the TUTURNwill not have the same value than TRTLA.
TUTURN= 0 by design as any difference between echo-reply



























Fig. 2: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve of
TNT trigger thresholds (FRPLA and RTLA). TRx refers to
TRTLA= x, while TFy to TFRPLA= y.
and time-exceeded replies for the Cisco router signature
indicates LSE-/IP-TTL shifting. In practice, we reinforce the
condition by looking for at least two consecutive hops having
a cumulated UTURN ≥ 3. Regarding LSE-TTL quoted in
time-exceeded, we have observed [20] that it oscillates
between 236 and 254. A value of 236 for TLSE_TTLis then
enough to detect the presence of an Opaque tunnel.
For our tests, we varied TRTLAand TFRPLAbetween 1 and 4.
A full measurement campaign was launched for each pair
of parameter value (thus, a total of 16 measurement runs).
Moreover for each pair, if no trigger is pulled, a so called
brute force revelation is undertaken: DPR/BRPR are launched
(with the use of the buddy if required). This brute force data
is used as a basis to evaluate the quality/cost tradeoff of the
two threshold values.
With the help of well calibrated thresholds, the results
associated to FRPLA and RTLA triggers allows for a binary
classification. These triggers provide a prediction, while the
results of additional probing gives the true facts when some
conditions apply, i.e., being or not a tunnel. With that in
mind, one can assess the performance of FRPLA and RTLA
triggers through the analysis of True Positive Rate (TPR) and
False Positive Rate (FPR): we plot the results on a Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve in Fig. 2. We define
TPR as the ratio of TNT success to the number of links
being actually MPLS tunnels (having a length greater than 1):
TNT triggers additional probing and actually reveals Invisible
tunnels (we have TPR + FNR = 1, i.e., when adding to
False Negative Rate, we obtain all links being long enough
tunnels). FPR is defined as the ratio of TNT failure to the
amount of standard IP links: it triggers for additional probing
but without revealing anything (we have FPR + TNR = 1,
i.e., when adding to True Negative Rate, we obtain all IP
links without tunnels). In this analysis the brute force data
provides the ground data that we consider reliable enough;
revelation is fired at each hop and, if nothing is revealed,
we consider that there is no tunnel (we do not consider
inconclusive cases as TNT did not cross the potential Ingress or
Egress LER). The red dotted diagonal provides the separation
between positive results for TNT (above part of the graph) and
negative results (below part of the graph). Finally, the black
dotted line extrapolates ground measurement results.
We observe that the results are essentially positive for
TNT and its two firing thresholds, TRTLAand TFRPLA. The best
calibration combination, between (TR1 , TF3 ) and (TR2 , TF3 ),
provides results offering a compromise close to 80%-20%:
while we expect to reveal at least 80% of existing tunnels
(MPLS artificial direct links), TNT has a controlled overhead
of 20%, i.e., it fires useless additional probing for an average
limited to two actual IP links over ten.
We also notice that the amount of probes required for
actually revealing the content of Invisible tunnels remains
almost stable, whatever the values for TFRPLAand TRTLA. The
additional traffic generated by erroneous trigger or by in-
conclusive revelation decreases while TFRPLAincreases. The
overhead of TNT is quite limited compared to a standard active
campaign (i.e., considering the overall information gathered).
When calibrated properly in order to limit both useless
probing and missed tunnels (e.g., TR1 , TF3 ), TNT can reveal
80% of hidden MPLS tunnels by generating less than 10% of
additional probing. Next section will show that those Invisible
tunnels accounts for more than 15% of MPLS tunnels in
general (absolute values are given in Table II).
VII. TUNNELS QUANTIFICATION WITH TNT
We deployed TNT on the Archipelago infrastructure [19] on
April 23rd, 2018 with parameters TFRPLAfixed to 3 and TRTLAto
1, according to results discussed in Sec. VI.
TNT has been deployed over 28 vantage points, scattered
all around the world: Europe (9), North America (11), South
America (1), Asia (4), and Australia (3). The overall set of
destinations, nearly 2,800,000 IP addresses, is inherited from
the Archipelago dataset and spread over the 28 VPs to speed
up the probing process.
A total of 522,049 distinct IP addresses (excluding
traceroute targets) has been collected, with 28,350 being
non publicly routable addresses (and thus excluded from
our dataset). Each collected routable IP address has been
pinged, only once per vantage point, allowing us to collect
additional data for fingerprinting [28]. Our dataset and our
post-processing scripts are freely available.2
Table II provides the number of MPLS tunnels discovered
by TNT, per tunnel class as indicated in the first column. The
indicators/triggers are provided, as well as the additional rev-
elation technique used. Without any surprise, Explicit tunnels
are the most prevalent class (76% of tunnels discovered).
Implicit tunnels represent 5% of the whole dataset, with the
UTURN indicator providing more results than qTTL. However,
those results must be taken with care as UTURN is subject
to false positive (implicit UTURN tunnels are likely to be
overestimated because of possible confusion with RTLA for
Juniper routers), while qTTL is much more reliable [29].
Compared to previous works, it is clear that this class is
not as prevalent as expected at the time, both because we
corrected and improved our methodology, and also because
the RFC4950 is likely to be more and more deployed.
Opaque tunnels are less prevalent (1.7% of tunnels discov-
ered). It is worth noticing that additional revelation techniques
(DPR or BRPR) does not perform well with such tunnels.
The content of 98% of Opaque tunnels cannot be revealed,
suggesting so that the vast majority of Opaque tunnels seems
to arise due to Cisco VPRNs.
The proportion of Invisible tunnels is not negligible (16%
of tunnels in our dataset). Those measurements clearly contra-
dicts our previous work suggesting that Invisible tunnels were
probably 40 to 50 times less numerous than Explicit ones [11,
Sec. 8]. More precisely, Invisible PHP is the most prominent
configuration (87% of Invisible tunnels belongs to the Invisible
PHP class), confirming so our last survey [12]. RTLA appears
as being the most efficient trigger. This is partially due to the
order of triggers in the TNT code as it favors a high ranked
trigger (RTLA) compared to low ranked one (FRPLA– in case
both apply, we prefer to use the most reliable, i.e., the less
subject to any interference such as BGP asymmetry). DPR
works better than BRPR, which is obvious as it is triggered
by RTLA (Juniper routers). For Invisible UHP, less numerous,
it is worth noticing that the buddy, prior to BRPR or DPR
revelation, was required in only 25% of the cases. In other
cases, a simple BRPR or DPR revelation was enough to get
the tunnel content.
The column labeled “mix” corresponds to tunnels partially
revealed thanks to BRPR and partially with DPR. Typically,
it comes from heterogeneous MPLS clouds. For instance,
ISP may deploy both Juniper and Cisco hardware without
any homogeneous prefixes distribution (i.e., local prefix for
Juniper, all prefixes for Cisco – See Sec. II-A for details). Note
that it is also possible that the UHP and PHP label popping
techniques co-exist when using our backward recursive path
revelation (BRPR). Although not explained in Sec. V for clarity
reasons, TNT can deal with such complex situations, making
the tool robust to pitfalls encountered in the wild (5% of the
Invisible tunnels encountered). The column labeled “1HOP”
corresponds to single LSR tunnels where DPR and BRPR
cannot be distinguished.
Finally, it is worth noting that some tunnels may belong
to multiple classes. We have indeed encountered situations in
which, e.g., an Explicit tunnel contains a few LSRs without
RFC4950 enabled (i.e., being so Implicit). Those tunnels and
their respective LSRs are not counted in Table II and represent
less than 5% of all tunnels founds.
While the column “# LSPs” provides the total amount
of MPLS tunnels detected or revealed per tunnel class, the
column “# LSRs” gives the contribution of each class in
terms of unique IP addresses detected (with indicators) or
revealed (with triggers). In both cases, the share of new MPLS
data (i.e., non-explicit) that was detected (for Implicit and
most Opaques) or revealed (for Invisible and few Opaques) is
significant, representing more than 20% of the overall quantity
of MPLS information.
Finally, Fig. 3 provides the distribution of path length with
standard traceroute and with TNT. We clearly see that
TNT leads to a shift of the distribution towards the right (longer
Tunnel Type Indicator/Trigger # LSP Revealed per Category # LSP # LSRs # LSRsDPR BRPR 1HOP Mix per LSP
Explicit LSE headers - - - - 150,036 31,749 2
Implicit qTTL - - - - 2,689 1,766 2UTURN - - - - 7,216 7,155 2
Opaque LSE-TTL 22 17 43 - 3,346 52 2
Invisible UHP DUP_IP 1,609 1,531 686 296 4,122 862 2
Invisible PHP RTLA 11,268 1,191 2,595 279 15,333 3,008 4FRPLA 5,903 2,555 3,260 1,012 12,730 2,897 3
Total 18,802 5,294 6,584 1,587 195,525 47,489 3
TABLE II: Raw number of tunnels discovered by TNT per tunnel category and class
(see Sec. III). No additional revelation technique is necessary for Explicit and Implicit
tunnels.





















Fig. 3: Path length distribution correc-
tion with TNT.
paths). This shift is lower than the median length of tunnels
given in the last column of Table II because all traces are
taken into account, even the ones with no tunnels. Vanaubel et
al. [12] have shown how revealing hidden tunnels also impact
standard Internet model metrics.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first revised the MPLS classification
proposed by Donnet et al. [11]. Second, we introduced TNT
(Trace the Naughty Tunnels), an extension to Paris traceroute
for revealing most MPLS tunnels along a path. Our fully
integrated tool reveals, or at least detect, all kinds of tunnels
in two simple stages. TNT relies on indicators and triggers to
classify and possibly tag tunnels as hidden, and then launches
additional probing to reveal their content. TNT provides the
ability to unveil the MPLS ecosystem deployed by ISP. Recent
works have indeed shown that MPLS is largely deployed by
most ISP [11], [22], [13]. By running TNT periodically from
largely distributed measurement platforms (e.g., Archipelago,
RIPE Atlas), we expect to see numerous researches using our
tool to correct graph properties and models used to better
understand the actual Internet topology.
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